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In June 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC) appeals 
chamber reversed what had been the court’s most significant verdict: a 
2016 conviction of a former Congolese vice-president, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, for crimes committed in the Central African Republic.1 This 
was significant because it was the court’s first conviction for crimes of 
sexual and gender-based violence and on the basis of command 
responsibility, and because Bemba was among the most senior-ranking 
officials to appear for trial at the court.2  
An acquittal needs to be understood as a legitimate outcome to any 
justice process, but, in context, the decision touched off alarm bells 
about the health of the institution. For one, the appeals chamber 
decision came ten years after Bemba was surrendered to the court, and 
fifteen years or more after the crimes underlying the case were 
committed.3 For another, given that the prosecution had only ever 
brought one core international crimes case arising out of its first Central 
 
* Elizabeth Evenson is the Associate Director of the International Justice 
Program at Human Rights Watch. She holds a B.A. from the University 
of Chicago, an M.Phil from the University of Nottingham, and a J.D. 
from Columbia Law School. 
1. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-1/05-01/08 (June 8, 2018).  
2. Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, High-Profile ICC Warning to Commanders on 
Rape, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 21, 2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/21/dispatches-high-profile-icc-
warning-commanders-rape [https://perma.cc/9DNN-U95R].  
3. Background: Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR, 
https://www.ijmonitor.org/jean-pierre-bemba-gombo-background/ 
[https://perma.cc/P6RS-YZNP]. 
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African Republic investigation, the acquittal left the court utterly 
empty-handed when it came to delivering on victims’ expectations for 
redress.4 In addition, beyond the majority opinion, there were two 
separate concurring opinions and a dissent; some observed this could 
make it difficult to discern key holdings in the future.5 A statement by 
the ICC president appeared to chastise the prosecution’s post-judgment 
statement, in which she expressed concern about aspects of the majority 
decision.6 
The acquittal also attracted attention given the court’s slim record. 
By that June, fifteen years after starting operations, there had been 
convictions in only three other cases for core international crimes and 
an acquittal in one.7 Judges had discontinued proceedings, or the 
prosecution had dropped charges for lack of evidence, in just as many 
cases.8  
 
4. Elise Keppler, No Redress for Central African Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (June 11, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/no-
redress-central-african-victims [https://perma.cc/94ZG-5TVU].  
5. See Joseph Powderly and Niamh Hayes, The Bemba Appeal: A 
Fragmented Appeals Chamber Destabilizes the Law and Practice of the 
ICC, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (June 26, 2018), 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2018/06/the-bemba-appeal-
fragmented-appeals.html [https://perma.cc/9N29-7KW6]; Douglas 
Guilfoyle, Part II-This is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in 
Trouble, EJIL: Tᴀʟᴋ! (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-
this-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/#more-17006 
[https://perma.cc/Q8FP-SN57]. 
6. See Press Release, ICC, Statement of the President of the Court in 
relation to the case of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180614-pres-stat 
[https://perma.cc/5337-LYBP].  
7. As of June 2018, the prosecution had secured convictions in cases against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgement (Dec. 
1, 2014); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement pursuant 
to article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-
01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016).  Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted. Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12 
A, Judgement (Apr. 7, 2015). A trial chamber has since convicted Bosco 
Ntaganda on all 18 counts of crimes against humanity brought by the 
prosecutor. See ICC: Congo Warlord Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/08/icc-congo-warlord-guilty-crimes-
against-humanity [https://perma.cc/CL5A-B33C].  
8. Pre-trial chambers did not confirm cases in one case each arising out of 
the Darfur, Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo situations. See 
Closed Stage, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/closed.aspx [https://perma.cc/GXA4-NYM9] (explaining 
how an ICC case closes and listing cases that are in the closed stage).  In 
one Kenya case, the pre-trial chamber did not confirm charges against 
one defendant, while a trial chamber, by a majority, subsequently vacated 
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Terminated cases included those against the president and deputy 
president of Kenya, proceedings their administration doggedly sought 
to undermine by any means necessary. The administration successfully 
capitalized on opposition to the court from some African leaders, as 
well as the court’s exclusive focus on investigations on the continent up 
to that point, throwing up a specter of mass withdrawal of African 
states parties from the treaty.9 While a mass withdrawal failed to 
materialize, it created a political and diplomatic distraction for ICC 
member states (one that still lingers in state party discussions), at a 
time when states should have been heavily engaged in building practical 
and political support for the court as a new institution.10 After all, the 
court’s record is also a product of state failure to assist in the arrest of 
more than a dozen ICC fugitives.11  
The Bemba appeals decision dropped like another stone onto a pile 
of concerns about the ICC. It was a pile that was still holding, but as 
more and more pieces began to drop in the following months—
culminating in the decision of an ICC pre-trial chamber to turn down 
an Afghanistan investigation—it took the shape of a landslide that 
threatens the credibility of the Rome Statute system. Without swift 
action - but more importantly effective and principled action - to shore 
up the court’s foundations, serious questions about its ability to fully 
deliver on its mandate will remain.  
This piece highlights some of the additional developments of the 
past months that have heightened concerns about the ICC. It then 
analyzes the need for the ICC in today’s world and the challenges that 
 
charges against the two remaining defendants, including Kenya’s deputy 
president, William Ruto, following what the judges termed a systematic 
effort to corrupt witnesses.  Id.  In the second Kenya case, the pre-trial 
chamber similarly did not confirm charges against one defendant, while 
the prosecution subsequently withdrew charges against the two remaining 
defendants, including Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, for lack of 
evidence.  Id.  In that case, the court found the government was in breach 
of its cooperation obligations.  Id.  Other cases have been closed, either 
because of the death of the defendant or following a successful 
admissibility challenge. Id.   
9. Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, THE 
N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacks-
international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/N67Z-VAZC]. 
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Evenson, Breaking the Rules: Kenya, the ICC, and 
the Twelfth Assembly of States Parties Session, in GLOBALIZATION AND 
ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 437–59 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2015).  
11. See Defendants at Large, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icc-
cpi.int/defendants?k=At%20large [https://perma.cc/694G-B6UM].  
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have prevented the court from more fully delivering on its mandate. It 
concludes with recommendations on the way forward.   
The ICC’s Terrible Year 
A few months after the Bemba decision, the U.S. government went 
on the offensive against the court.12 It saddled the institution and its 
states parties with another political challenge to the court’s 
legitimacy.13 In a September 2018 speech in Washington, D.C., then-
U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton resumed his role as the 
ICC’s chief opponent, announcing the US would break ties with the 
court and threatening to sanction ICC staff and member countries 
should ICC investigations touch U.S. nationals or U.S. allies.14 The 
context was the ICC prosecutor’s then-pending request for an 
investigation in Afghanistan,15 an investigation that might have 
included conduct by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and military 
personnel, and the prosecutor’s preliminary inquiry into the situation 
in Palestine. Bolton’s remarks were confirmed by U.S. President Donald 
Trump from the UN General Assembly podium,16 and in March 2019, 
the U.S. acted on those threats, ultimately revoking the prosecutor’s 
visa to the United States.17 
In January 2019, a trial chamber acquitted, by a majority, the 
former president of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, and a co-defendant, 
without requiring the defense to mount a case.18 This was  played out 
 
12. Elizabeth Evenson, US Takes Aim at the International Criminal Court, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/11/us-takes-aim-international-
criminal-court [https://perma.cc/3RQ6-YZUS]. 
13. See id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President 
Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 
25, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nations-
general-assembly-new-york-ny/).  
17. US Threatens International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(March 15, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/us-threatens-
international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/D23D-5VFZ]; Mike 
Corder, US Revokes Visa for International Court Prosecutor Bensouda, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 5, 2019), 
https://www.apnews.com/a5e0748b9b7443e683c6a0f4e0c7d509 
[https://perma.cc/5967-U4Z7]. 
18. Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Trial Chamber I 
Acquits Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé from All Charges (Jan. 
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in the context of a situation in which the prosecution’s failure to bring 
cases against those supportive of President Alassane Ouattara, who 
allegedly committed grave crimes, had already polarized opinion about 
the court domestically.19 The judges did not issue detailed written 
reasons simultaneously with the acquittal, and a written judgement was 
only filed in July.20 This challenged court efforts to explain the decision 
to Ivorians. The prosecution is likely still to appeal.  
Other developments—including a lawsuit by a small number of the 
court’s judges before the International Labour Organization seeking a 
pay rise,21 after states parties failed to take decisive action on the 
request, and the decision of the Japanese government to appoint one of 
the court’s judges as its ambassador to Estonia while she was still 
serving on a trial chamber22 (she later resigned the ambassadorship)—
brought unflattering attention to the court’s bench.23  
In some respects, these developments still did not feel like they 
marked some particularly new or different moment. As serious as they 
were, most of all for the individual victims looking to the court for 
redress, problems in investigations and too-little attention to the court’s 
real world impact were not new, and had been the focus of advocacy 
and attention for some time.24 What felt new, perhaps, was that the 
 
15, 2019), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1427 
[https://perma.cc/PU4R-KRPE]. 
19. Making Justice Count: Lessons from the ICC’s Work in Cote d’Ivoire, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 4, 
2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04/making-justice-
count/lessons-iccs-work-cote-divoire [https://perma.cc/HC52-7GPA]. 
20. See ICC Prosecutors to Appeal Acquittal of Former Ivory Coast President 
Laurent Gbagbo, FRANCE 24 (Sept. 16, 2018), 
https://www.france24.com/en/20190916-icc-prosecutors-appeal-
acquittal-former-ivory-coast-president-laurent-gbagbo 
[https://perma.cc/8JT4-PTBX].  
21. Marlise Simons, In The Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges Wrangle 
Over Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/europe/hague-judges-
pay.html [https://perma.cc/DT3V-KTCU].  
22. Kevin Jon Heller, Ntaganda Defence Reacts to the Judge Ozaki 
Revelations, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 4, 2019), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/01/ntaganda-defence-reacts-to-the-judge-
ozaki-revelations/ [https://perma.cc/QB49-CNGX]. 
23. See Simons, supra note 22; ICC: Congo Warlord Guilty of Crimes Against 
Humanity, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/08/icc-congo-warlord-guilty-crimes-
against-humanity [https://perma.cc/CS3U-9UNL] (noting that Ntaganda 
filed a request to disqualify the judge, but the request was ultimately 
rejected by a plenary of judges). 
24. For example, the NGO Coalition for the ICC has an outreach and 
communications team that has repeatedly stressed the importance of 
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margin of error was shrinking as the court’s stature brought increased 
scrutiny. Still, even Bolton’s noxious offensive was charged with a silver 
lining of revitalizing state party support to rally against external 
threats by a discreditable U.S. administration.25 The end of 2018 also 
saw arrests in the court’s first cases in its second Central African 
Republic investigation, which is focused on the conflict there since 
2012.26 
But in April, a pre-trial chamber rejected the prosecution’s request 
to open an investigation in Afghanistan.27 Judges found that the 
 
strengthened engagement with affected communities.  See 
Communications and Outreach, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL CT., 
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/communications-and-outreach 
[https://perma.cc/367Y-CZRH].  The Victims’ Rights Working Group, 
also created through the Coalition for the ICC, has addressed the 
constellation of issues surrounding effective victim participation and 
representation before the court, including the delivery of reparations.  See 
Who We Are, VICTIMS’ RIGHTS WORKING GROUP, 
http://www.vrwg.org/about-vrwg/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/6J9D-
PDPK].  See also Elizabeth Evenson, Making Justice Count: Lessons from 
the ICC’s Work in Cote d’Ivoire, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 4, 2015), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04/making-justice-count/lessons-
iccs-work-cote-divoire [https://perma.cc/3JCG-B4GW]; Unfinished 
Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Sept. 15, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/15/unfinished-business/closing-
gaps-selection-icc-cases [perma.cc/H86Q-QPPN]; Impunity Restored? 
Lessons learned from the failure of the Kenyan cases at the International 
Criminal Court, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH TRUTH AND JUSTICE (Nov. 23, 
2016), https://kptj.or.ke/impunity-restored-lessons-learned-from-the-
failure-of-the-kenyan-cases-at-the-international-criminal-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/WN77-DRJB]; AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF L. WAR 
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, 
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR (2012), https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-
programs/warcrimes/our-projects/icc-legal-analysis-and-education-
project/reports/report-16-investigative-management-strategies-and-
techniques-of-the-international-criminal-courts-office-of-the-prosecutor/ 
[https://perma.cc/WCT7-HH4Y].  
25. Adam Taylor, John Bolton Hates the International Criminal Court. That 
Might Make Other Countries Love It, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/10/john-bolton-hates-
international-criminal-court-that-might-make-other-countries-love-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/397E-UQEU].  
26. Elise Keppler, Justice Moves Ahead in the Central African Republic, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 12, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/13/justice-moves-ahead-central-
african-republic [https://perma.cc/DT8W-MSJB].  
27. Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶ 
96 (Apr. 12, 2019).  
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prosecution had satisfied its burden as to the existence of crimes within 
the court’s jurisdiction and the absence of national proceedings that 
would cut off its mandate.28 They nonetheless found that an 
investigation would not be in “the interests of justice,” a term of art in 
the Rome Statute, because the cooperation challenges—likely a nod to 
the Trump administration’s threats, as well as political developments 
in Afghanistan—were so steep as to limit the likelihood of successful 
prosecution.29 The prosecution, they concluded, should invest its scarce 
resources elsewhere.30  
This was shocking. Shocking in what gave rise to the appearance of 
capitulation to external pressure, most of all, but also in the eating 
away of the court’s mandate were the decision followed to its logical 
conclusion across the court’s work. The very nature of that work 
requires the court to confront powerful interests opposed to 
accountability. Cooperation is also dynamic and subject to influence—
as changes in domestic politics and the pressure applied by the United 
States and the European Union shows in the context of cooperation 
with the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.31 Requiring guarantees of 
cooperation from the outset renders the ICC’s investigations a null set.32 
Of course, the decision did not bar the court’s doors. In fact, appeals 
proceedings have been launched with regard to the Afghanistan 
decision. Work goes on—including a fresh request from the prosecution 
to investigate crimes connected to the forced displacement of the 
Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh.33 Work goes on at ICC 
headquarters and in its country offices, in the scrum of diplomats in 
The Hague and in New York charged with following ICC matters, and 
in civil society organizations globally who speak out against abuses, 
support victims, and catalyze government support for justice. But the 
court is facing very significant questions as to whether it will be allowed 
(politically) and whether it is capable (in its own practices, policies, 
and legal framework) of delivering on its founders’ ambitions twenty 
years ago in Rome Addressing these questions in a manner that pushes 
 
28. Id. 
29. Id. ¶ 95.  
30. Id. 
31. VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS: 
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 65 (2008). 
32. See Param-Preet Singh, In Afghanistan, the ICC Abandons the Field, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (April 23, 2019), 
https://www.openglobalrights.org/In-afghanistan-the-ICC-abandons-the-
field/ [https://perma.cc/XFB4-KMHL].  
33. Param-Preet Singh, ICC Prosecutor Seeking to Investigate Crimes 
Against Rohingya, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2019), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/icc-prosecutor-seeking-
investigate-crimes-against-rohingya [https://perma.cc/3XKT-R42V].  
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the ICC forward—rather than scales back on those ambitions—is the 
essential task now.  
Is the ICC Worth Saving?  
The ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, was adopted in 
1998.34 This was on the back of horrific atrocities, including genocides 
in Rwanda and Bosnia.35 Individual tribunals had been set up by the 
UN to address these situations.36 This gave new impetus to long-
standing ambition to create a permanent court with a mandate over 
the world’s worst crimes.37 A permanent, international court to enforce 
the global rule of law by prosecuting these crimes—and doing so 
impartially, not as a matter of victor’s justice— would help to turn the 
page on the 20th century’s history of rampant crimes committed with 
impunity.38  
Built into the Rome Statute system was the ambition to bring 
together its global reach with its local application.  
Global reach because although the court is treaty based, meaning 
its widest application is within states parties, through the UN Security 
Council and through ad hoc acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by 
states, its reach could be potentially universal.39 This, along with the 
absence of immunities within the statute, meant that the court could 
in theory act to ensure that no one was above the law, no matter how 
powerful they or their allies might be.40 This year, against the backdrop 
of considerable controversy and problems in state party compliance in 
 
34. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in force on July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
35. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5NQX-CRVU].  
36. UN Documentation: International Law, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY 
(May 2, 2019), https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts 
[https://perma.cc/P4RZ-VW7E].  
37. INT’L CRIMINAL CT., UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 1, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U7UK-MHZ2].  
38. See Richard Dicker and Amy Braunschweiger, Interview: The Future of 
International Justice Amid Boundless Cruelty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(July 11, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/11/interview-
future-international-justice-amid-boundless-cruelty 
[https://perma.cc/8SGA-LG2Q].  
39. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art. 
12–13. 
40. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art. 
27. 
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the arrest of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, ICC appeals 
judges confirmed that there is no head-of-state immunity for sitting 
leaders before the court where it otherwise has jurisdiction.41 
Alongside a global reach for the court itself, local application of 
international criminal law was built into the treaty.42 The Rome Statute 
sets up the ICC as a court of last resort—it can only intervene where 
national authorities cannot or do not act to prosecute these crimes.43 It 
sets in place the ICC as a court, but also a broader Rome Statute 
system for justice rooted in the national law and courts of ICC states 
parties.44  
In spite of the sizeable efforts to put in place this innovative and 
sui generis court—which also has strong provisions in its treaty on 
sexual and gender-based crimes and victims’ rights—many thought at 
the time that it might not actually be needed, that the horrors of the 
20th century would not be repeated.  
Unfortunately, the ICC as a court remains as relevant today, if not 
more so, given the ongoing commission of Rome Statute crimes. The 
Rome Statute has been an engine of important law reform where the 
treaty has been implemented in national law, which could one day 
increase the local application of its law.45 But in many places, the 
technical capacity, and perhaps more importantly, political will to 
support independent, impartial investigations of serious international 
crimes remains lacking.46 Support is available to national prosecutions 
of international crimes, but some mechanisms set up in recent years -  
like the EU toolkit on complementarity and an Assembly of States 
Parties platform to facilitate this assistance - have not been fully 
utilized.47 While there are some alternatives to ICC action, so far, these 
are simply too few.   
 
41. See ICC: Jordan Was Required to Arrest Sudan’s Bashir, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (May 6, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/06/icc-
jordan-was-required-arrest-sudans-bashir [https://perma.cc/T8JQ-
GHPP].  
42. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art. 
17. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. 
45. See Implementing Legislation on the Rome Statute, PARLIAMENTARIANS 
FOR GLOBAL ACTION, https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/rome-
statute/implementing-legislation.html [https://perma.cc/EE4T-C67K]. 
46. See Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (May 3, 2018), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/03/pressure-point-iccs-impact-
national-justice/lessons-colombia-georgia-guinea-and 
[https://perma.cc/RMK2-8NER]. 
47. High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy and European Commission, Joint Staff Working 
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Challenges in Practice  
If the need for the ICC as a particularly important vehicle for 
accountability remains, the challenges in practice have been enough to 
question whether the court can ever work as intended.  
That is not to say that the Rome Statute project is not without 
successes. The ICC’s existence is exerting a powerful normative force. 
For example, the quest for justice for the situation in Syria was blocked 
by political divides within the UN Security Council on an ICC referral.48 
But it was then channeled into the creation, by the UN General 
Assembly, of an innovative investigative mechanism to prepare case 
files for future prosecutions.49 The engagement of the ICC prosecution 
with national authorities can be a plus-factor for justice, as in Guinea 
and to a lesser extent Colombia, although practice needs to be 
strengthened and better supported by other partners to realize greater 
effects.50   
But in its own investigations and prosecutions, as a court engaged 
in a diverse range of countries, the ICC has underperformed. There have 
been lengthy court proceedings; divergent approaches by chambers on 
key issues; challenges in selecting cases and getting cases the 
prosecution brings to trial, and once at trial, in securing convictions; 
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questions on defense and victims’ rights, including the development of 
legal aid policies; and a shallow footprint in countries where 
investigation take place. Together these limit the ICC’s impact.51 As 
noted above, these issues are not new, but they have come thundering 
to the forefront over the past year.  
A turbulent landscape on which the ICC works has sharpened 
attention to the court’s missteps.  
This is not 1998. There is a broader retreat underway from the 
global rule of law. As noted above, the U.S. has returned to the hostile 
approach it took during the ICC’s earliest years. The most immediate 
context for U.S. action was the potential Afghanistan investigation that 
could have touched on U.S. conduct there.52 But the U.S. has made 
clear that it might also act to undermine other potential ICC 
investigations.53 The Philippines and Burundi withdrew from the court 
when faced with potential investigations,54 while the Russian 
government “unsigned” the ICC treaty as the prosecution reported on 
progress in its preliminary inquiry of the situation in Ukraine.55 
The reasons for the court’s underperformance need to be better 
understood.   
Some factors are within the control of the court itself—mistakes 
made in the policies and practices of ICC officials.56 These include poor 
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54. Param-Preet Singh, Philippines Pullout From ICC Won’t Block Justice 
for ‘Drug War’, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 18, 2019, 8:32 AM), 
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choices in early investigative methodologies and strategies, now 
acknowledged by the Office of the Prosecutor.57  
Other factors have to do with the role of ICC states parties. The 
court relies to a very significant degree on cooperation and other 
support by states—in arrests, in investigations, in addressing witness 
and victim protection and witness interference, and in meeting defense 
rights.58 It also relies on states to elect its officials and provide sufficient 
funding.59 There have been gaps (and at times, obstruction) in each of 
these areas.60 Years of demand by some states parties—including 
Colombia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom, in varying degrees(to hold down increases in the court’s 
budget, sometimes couched as a call for “zero nominal growth”)—have 
deprived the court of the resources it needs to deepen its impact.61   
It was thought that a permanent court would have several 
advantages, including the ability to act more quickly during ongoing 
conflict.62 But in fact, when it comes to political support, its 
permanence has largely operated to its detriment. While creating a new 
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tribunal would be a heavy political and financial lift, something not so 
dissimilar turns out to be required for each new ICC situation. 
Additional budgetary allocations, but also building anew the political 
consensus and support for the ICC to act, and specific networks for 
practical assistance in investigations, for the defense, to support 
outreach and victims, tailored to each country’situation are needed. 
Security Council and state party referrals have hardly proven to be the 
guarantor of cooperation on the sustained basis required for success.  
States parties remain engaged on the ICC. This includes dedicated 
focal points in some ministries and embassy staff in The Hague.63 There 
have been significant policy initiatives to address cooperation.64 But the 
court’s permanence can facilitate a fatigue in which the ICC lacks 
sustained attention to its sizeable and enduring cooperation needs day-
in and day-out, as well as the creativity to rethink and adapt to new 
situations.  
Beyond state party cooperation, the court’s permanence in an era 
in which Rome Statute crimes are being committed in far too many 
places around the globe has also gradually brought on an even more 
profound challenge.  
The court has eleven open situations under investigation and is 
seeking investigations in Bangladesh/Myanmar and, depending on the 
outcome of appeal proceedings, Afghanistan.65 There are several other 
preliminary examinations pending which may satisfy the Rome Statute 
criteria for investigation.66 As the prosecutor’s current strategic plan 
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acknowledges, “stakeholders expect the Office [of the Prosecutor] to 
deliver more and better results, preferably within a shorter time and 
some expect this to be accomplished within the bounds of existing or 
with even fewer resources,” and, on the other hand, “in the coming 
years, the Office expects to face an increase in the number of situations 
under investigation as its ongoing preliminary examinations progress, 
while resources are unlikely to significantly increase.”67  
As we have noted elsewhere, this is a critical challenge with few 
easy answers.68  
This leaves the court at a crossroads. In one direction, the court is 
needed to do more than ever, and, at least prior to the decision on 
Afghanistan, it was on the verge of showing its power as a court and a 
system to take on situations thought to be beyond the reach of justice.69 
In the other, the ICC is facing credible questions as to whether it and 
its states parties are up-to-the task, especially in difficult political times. 
Can the court better succeed or will these challenges result in efforts to 
curtail the court’s founding ambitions, undercutting victims’ access to 
justice and rolling back on the international community’s commitment 
to the fight against impunity?  
Where to Go from Here 
States parties—particularly following a speech by the United 
Kingdom at the 2018 annual meeting of ICC states parties70— are 
seized of the court’s challenges and have set in motion a review 
process.71 The scope and modalities for this review process remain to be 
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identified, but there are certainly real opportunities to address 
challenges—including a review of nomination and election procedures 
for judges and a thorough, merit-based, search for the court’s next 
prosecutor, to be elected in 2020.72  
There is a genuineness to state party concern and participation in 
discussions around this review process. Certainly, that commitment and 
attention is to be welcomed, particularly where it has overlapped with 
efforts by states to lead on responding to the political challenges of the 
day, like the US’s threats, through joint statements and Assembly 
resolutions.73  
But states’ agendas are many. The United Kingdom has been clear 
in its demands for “timelines” and “closure strategies” to the 
prosecutor’s “cases,” including its preliminary examinations.74 
Attention to the prosecutor’s preliminary examination practice and the 
need, on a court-wide basis, to consider when and how to wind-down 
work in situations under investigation to enhance the court’s legacy are 
important. Yet one of the prosecutor’s preliminary examinations 
concerns allegations of abuse in Iraq by UK forces that national courts 
have thus far failed to prosecute.75 Demands for budgetary limits have 
been justified in the past by trumping up the court’s purported 
inefficiencies in its use of resources, for example, at one point, the 
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position of some states parties that court outreach programs to affected 
communities were not within the court’s core mandate.76 
There needs to be real attention paid to any signs that the review 
process will be used as a Trojan horse with which to impede judicial 
and prosecutorial independence, rather than to undertake changes 
necessary to strengthen the court. What is challenging, however, is that 
a vision for some of “strengthening” the court could include, as the pre-
trial chamber’s Afghanistan decision seems to suggest, cutting back on 
the full ambitions of the Rome Statute in light of the challenges the 
project has faced to date.77  
But a court without those ambitions would not be one worth 
having. To mitigate these risks, any review process of the court’s work 
should be anchored in an assessment first by an independent group of 
experts. These experts should be independent of the court and of states 
parties. They should be career professionals with demonstrated 
expertise in investigating, prosecuting, defending, and adjudicating 
complex criminal offenses, as well as managing bodies comparable to 
the ICC’s organs. They could assess court practice and recommend 
changes. While the experts themselves, once appointed and in 
consultation with the court, states parties, and civil society, should set 
the specific terms of references themselves, their assessment should be 
aimed at how the court’s mandate can be better implemented in 
practice, for example, through strengthened investigations and 
improved management of judicial proceedings, rather than revisiting 
the court’s purpose or mission. Similar assessments have been carried 
out for the ad hoc tribunals and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.78  
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To be sure, alongside an independent expert panel, the court on its 
own can continue to learn lessons from its practice and implement 
changes. States parties can similarly examine their own practices and 
start to work on issues that require more urgent action (for example, 
strengthening the procedures for the nomination and election of judges). 
But these “internal” and ad hoc change processes appear insufficient in 
light of the challenges that the past year displayed. Meanwhile, by 
memorializing these findings and recommendations in a public report, 
and addressing the court’s work holistically, the independent expert 
panel’s work would serve as a common and credible reference point. 
This is currently lacking in discussions about review and reform. An 
independent expert panel would help ensure the right kind of change to 
support, rather than erode, the determination of Rome that “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole 
must not go unpunished.”79   
 
 
79. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 35, at pmbl.  
 
